This chapter provides a selective survey of recent developments in the study of social welfare under oligopoly. The main topics covered are (i) the rate of cost pass through as a tool to analyze market performance; (ii) the quantification of welfare losses due to market power in Cournot-style models; and (iii) new results from models with endogenous entry. The chapter highlights common themes across these topics and identi.es areas for future research.
Introduction

Objectives
Market performance under imperfect competition has been a classic question for economists since the time of Adam Smith. It remains a central concern of the theoretical and empirical industrial-organization (IO) literature and anti-trust policymakers dealing with competition issues in practice.
The objective of this chapter is to survey recent developments in the IO theory literature that speak to oligopoly and welfare. The coverage here is explicitly selective, concentrating on areas where the literature has substantially progressed over the last 5-10 years.
Related issues have been covered extensively by several authors in the past. Valuable resources remain the early survey chapter by Shapiro (1989) as well as the oligopoly-theory books by Tirole (1988) and Vives (1999) which also contain signi…cant material on welfare.
The uniqueness of this chapter lies in the following. First, the focus is speci…cally on welfare; most other treatments deal with this only as a by-product. Second, it covers recent developments which have not yet found their way into textbook treatments-but hopefully will do so in the near future. Third, it discusses separate strands of the recent literature in a way that highlights their common themes.
Scope
The scope of this chapter is limited to relatively simple static oligopoly models under partial-equilibrium analysis. 1 It concentrates on theory-albeit in a way that it is informed by the empirical literature and speaks to industrial applications. Extensions to more complex settings are dealt with by other chapters contained in this volume.
Market power lies solely with …rms while buyers are atomistic; there is no price discrimination. The focus is on markets with varying degrees of competitive conduct-rather than tacit collusion or price …xing. Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral pro…t-maximizers and are equally well informed about the market. There are no other market failures (such as environmental externalities) and no explicit role for regulation (such as price caps) or other policy interventions.
The de…nition of "welfare" (W ) is mostly taken to be social surplus, that is, the unweighted sum of aggregate consumer surplus (CS) and aggregate producer surplus ( ): W = CS + . A consumer-welfare standard is highlighted in some places given that recent antitrust policy in jurisdictions such as the US and EU is said to be geared more heavily towards consumers. 2 The results discussed cover a range of models with homogeneous products as well as di¤erent forms of horizontal product di¤erentiation. Some of the homogeneous-products results apply equally to settings with vertical di¤erentiation in which there are (known) di¤erences in product quality across …rms. Many of the models are "aggregative games"in which a …rm's competitive environment can be captured using a single summary statistic of rivals'actions.
These models have useful application across a wide array of industries. In the energy sector, similar homogeneous-product models are widely employed in the analysis of electricity, natural gas and crude oil markets-as well as energy-intensive industry such as cement and steel. The di¤erentiated-price models covered form the basis for competition policy in sectors with branded products.
Plan for the chapter
Section 2 presents the recent literature on the rate of cost pass-through as an economic tool to understand the market performance and the division of surplus between buyers and sellers. Section 3 discusses recent papers which quantify market performance in various Cournot-style models using welfare losses, that is, the comparison between equilibrium welfare and …rst-best. Section 4 covers recent developments in the theory of oligopoly with endogenous entry of …rms, with a focus on the quanti…cation of welfare losses and the impact of …rm heterogeneity. Section 5 gives concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 2 See Farrell and Katz (2006) for a discussion of welfare standards in antitrust. Armstrong and Vickers (2010) study a model in which a consumer-welfare standard can, for strategic reasons, be optimal even if the regulator cares about total welfare (because the standard a¤ects the set of mergers that is proposed by …rms).
Cost pass-through and the division of surplus
Consider the treatment of monopoly in a textbook on microeconomics or industrial organization. With linear demand and costs, the monopolist captures 50% of the (potential) gains from trade, with 25% as consumer surplus-and the remainder as deadweight loss.
So there is a ratio of 1:2 between consumer surplus and producer surplus.
Elsewhere, the textbook may turn to the question of cost pass-through: how much of a unit tax is passed onto the market price? For a linear monopoly, the rate of pass-through ( P= M C) equals 50%. So there is a ratio of 1:2 between the price change and the cost increase.
What textbooks do not say is that this is no coincidence. The ratio of consumer to producer surplus, in equilibrium, is equal to the rate of cost pass-through in that market. Weyl & Fabinger (2013) develop this insight more broadly, including for various representations of oligopoly, and argue that pass-through is a versatile tool to think about market performance.
Much earlier, Bulow & P ‡eiderer (1983) noted how monopoly cost pass-through varies with the shape of the demand curve, i.e., its curvature. Kimmel (1992) exploits this link to frame the pro…t-impact of a unit tax in a Cournot oligopoly in terms of pass-through. Anderson & Renault (2003) study the relationship between demand curvature and the division of surplus under Cournot competition but do not explicitly cover pass-through.
Weyl & Fabinger (2013) tie together these various antecedents.
Monopoly case
Consider a monopolist which produces a single good with marginal cost c + t, where t 0 is a parameter. The monopolist faces inverse demand p(Q); let D(p) be the corresponding direct demand. At the optimum, marginal revenue equals marginal cost, M R(Q) = c + t.
What is the impact of a small increase in t? Let dp=dt denote the rate of cost passthrough, which measures how price responds to a $1 increase in marginal cost. 3 Denote consumer surplus CS = R 1 p D(x)dx, and observe that dCS=dt = Q, at the optimum.
Similarly, by the envelope theorem, the pro…t impact d =dt = Q, since the indirect 3 Another formulation, more frequently used in the international trade literature, instead concerns the pass-through elasticity (dp=p)=(dt=t)
, which also incorporates the pro…t margin.
impact of the tax is zero since the monopolist is optimizing. Hence the burden of an in…nitesimal tax, starting at zero, is split according to
where (0) is pass-through at the price corresponding to initial zero tax rate.
Consider now a discrete increase in the tax from t 0 to t 1 > t 0 . Write Q(t) for the optimal quantity as a function of the tax. The changes in consumer surplus and monopoly pro…ts satisfy CS
(t)Q(t)dt and
De…ne the quantityweighted pass-through over the interval [t 0 ; t 1 ] as
t as the hypothetical tax rate at which the market is eliminated, that is, Q(t) = 0, and call the average quantity-weighted pass-through rate t 0 . 4 Hence the surplus generated from the market's "birth" (at t) to the equilibrium status quo (at t = 0) satis…es
Consumer surplus is generated by the market at a rate of monopoly pro…ts times the passthrough rate, weighted over the inframarginal market quantities traded over the interval
. This takes into account that the pass-through rate may not be a constant.
Intuitively, high pass-through means that price closely tracks marginal cost, so that (i) the monopolist's degree of market power is "low", and, conversely, (ii) realized social surplus is "high" and largely goes to consumers. With low pass-through, price follows more closely consumers' willingness-to-pay so the monopolist captures the bulk of the gains from trade.
Bulow and P ‡eiderer (1983) showed that monopoly pass-through satis…es:
,
is the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand, which is a measure of demand curvature. The common theory assumption (Bergstrom and Bagnoli 2005) that direct demand D(p) is log-concave (i.e., log D(p) is concave in 4 Some demand curves have t = 1, though a …nite choke price can be assumed.
p), corresponds to 1, and hence to pass-through (weakly) less than 100%. Loosely put, the monopolist then captures a greater share of the gains from trade than consumers.
For very concave demand, 0, the "triangle" left as consumer surplus is very small; correspondingly the ratio CS= and pass-through are both small-as is the remaining deadweight loss.
For many familiar demand curves, the ratio p 0 (Q)=M R 0 (Q) is constant, so pass-through is a constant with (t) = for all t 2 [0; t]-and so the "local" properties of demand are also "global". With linear demand, marginal revenue is everywhere twice as steep as demand, so pass-through = 1 2 . Other examples are constant-elasticity demand, for which = 1 + 1= > 1 (violating log-concavity) where p(Q)=Qp 0 (Q) > 0 is the price elasticity, and exponential demand D(p) = exp (( p)= ), for which = 1 as it is log-linear. In such cases, the marginal impact of a tax is equal to its average impact,
The literature has found di¤erent ways of representing "constant"higher-order proper- respectively describe its location, scale and shape (with 0 = ( ! ) and 1 = !).
Oligopoly models
The preceding insights generalize to certain n-…rm oligopoly models. Consider a general reduced-form model of competition in which …rm i's pro…ts i = (p i c)q i and the Lerner index (price-cost margin) with symmetric …rms is determined as:
where is a "conduct parameter"which measures the intensity of competition, and " D p(Q)=Qp 0 (Q) is the market-level price elasticity of demand. 5 The previous monopoly analysis corresponds to joint pro…t-maximization with = 1. This setup nests various widely-used models of symmetric oligopoly, including the two following models:
Homogeneous-product oligopoly. Consider a Cournot model augmented with "conjectural variations": when …rm i chooses its output it conjectures that each other …rm j will adjust its quantity by dq j = [R=(n 1)]dq i . So the aggregate responses by all its rivals is given by d(
Cournot-Nash competition corresponds to R = 0 while Bertrand competition in e¤ect has R = 1 (so the price stays …xed). Conjectural variations can be seen as a reduced-form way of incorporating (unmodelled) dynamic features of the game that …rms play (Cabral 1995) .
The …rst-order order condition for …rm i has
where Q P n i=1 q i is industry output. This can be re-arranged to give the symmetric equilibrium (with q i = Q=n):
Thus a constant conjectural variation R corresponds to a constant conduct parameter .
Di¤erentiated-products price competition. Consider a model of price-setting competition with symmetrically di¤erentiated products. Firm i's demand q i (p i ; p i ) depends on its own price and those of its n 1 rivals. In symmetric equilibrium (with q i = q = Q=n), the corresponding price can be written as p(q), which captures how each price changes in response to a simultaneous change in all …rms'outputs.
The …rst-order condition, at symmetric equilibrium, for …rm i is given by the inverseelasticity rule, (p c t)=p = (q=p)=(@q i =@p i ). The elasticity of market demand is " D = (p=q) P n j=1 (@q i =@p j ), and so:
where A is the "diversion ratio"from …rm i to the rest of the industry as it raises its price (Shapiro 1996) . 6 With a linear demand system, for example, A is constant-and hence the conduct parameter is also constant.
As in the monopoly case, the envelope theorem together with the symmetric demand structure imply that the marginal impact of an increase in the tax rate on consumer surplus is given by dCS=dt = (t)Q(t). Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that the marginal impact on producers is given by d =dt = [1 (t)(1 (t))]Q(t), where industry pro…ts P n i=1 i . So the burden of an in…nitesimal tax, starting at zero, is split according to:
This is a clean generalization of the monopoly case, with some intuitive properties. For given pass-through (0), less competitive conduct (higher ) skews the division of surplus from consumers to producers. For given conduct , higher pass-through favours consumers.
The pass-through rate is here given endogenously by:
where " d log (q)=d log q is the elasticity of the conduct parameters to changes in output, and " M CS d log CS 0 (Q)=d log Q measures how responsive the marginal consumer
in aggregate output. 7 The pass-through rate, in general, must capture how both of these metrics may vary as the tax a¤ects equilibrium quantities. For example, if the tax reduces per-…rm output (dq=dt < 0) and this makes the industry more competitive (d =dq > 0), then this will tend to enhance pass-through. Note also that pass-through depends 6 With the symmetric demand structure,
indirectly on the number of …rms, since this will generally enter into (t). 8 As in the monopoly case, it is possible to go from this local impact to the global division of surplus by appropriately weighting how pass-through rates changes along the demand curve.
With "constant conduct"and "constant curvature", the global division of surplus again follows immediately from its local properties. As noted above, many oligopoly models feature (t) = so that " = 0. It is also instructive to write out
in terms of demand curvature. (Log-concave demand < 1 corresponds to " M CS > 0 ,
which nests the well-known Cournot-Nash oligopoly result (Kimmel 1992 ) when = 1=n.
Discussion
The insight that the division of surplus is pinned down by the rate of pass-through has a number of appealing features. First, it allows pass-through to be seen as a "su¢ cient statistic" for welfare analysis. Second, pass-through estimates already exist in the literature for many markets-based on studies of taxation, exchange rates, and other cost shifts.
Third, it makes it easier to form intuitions about market performance since pass-through rates are often easier to think about than higher-order properties of demand.
Information on pass-through can also be used in the reverse direction. For price competition with di¤erentiated products, Miller, Remer & Sheu (2013) instead emphasize how, assuming second-order demand properties (i.e., demand curvatures), the matrix of passthrough rates across products can be used to estimate a matrix of "…rst-order"cross-price elasticities. The attraction of this is that it sidesteps the problem of full-scale estimation of the demand system-which can be time-consuming or even infeasible.
While it is relatively easy to obtain empirical estimates of pass-through, it is more di¢ cult to ascertain how pass-through itself varies along a demand curve. Yet, strictly speaking, the theory requires the quantity-weighted pass-through to adjust the de…nition of pass-through to incorporate these but this means that estimating this "adjusted"pass-through rate becomes increasingly di¢ cult-and begins to merge into estimation of a full-scale market model. The power of pass-through is strongest for monopoly.
Another assumption is that the number of the …rms'in the market is …xed, and hence invariant to changes in costs. Ritz (2014b) shows that, with log-convex demand, a higher unit-tax can induce additional entry into a market, and thus ultimately lead to a lower market price. Negative pass-through, also known as "Edgeworth's paradox of taxation", is ruled out in the models covered here. Conversely, a low pass-through rate can induce exit of weaker …rms which in turn causes price to jump back up. 9 3 Quantifying welfare losses in Cournot-style models Consider a textbook Cournot oligopoly with symmetric …rms. How large are welfare losses due to market power? With three …rms, they equal 6 2 3 %; in other words, a highly concentrated Cournot triopoly delivers over 93% of the maximum possible welfare. 10 For a duopoly, the loss is 11%-certainly not trivial, but not large either.
A recent literature quanti…es market performance directly in terms of realized welfare (Corchón 2008; Ritz 2014) . It shows that welfare losses in familiar oligopoly models are often perhaps surprisingly small, and also shows what market factors can generate more 9 Further a…eld, in the context of the commercial banking industry, Ritz & Walther (2015) show how risk aversion and informational frictions tend to dampen the pass-through of changes in interest rates across loan and deposit markets.
1 0 For a duopoly in which one …rm is a Stackelberg leader, the welfare loss also equals 6 2 3 percent-so the social value of leadership is equal to one additional entrant. substantial losses.
The approach is based on calculating equilibrium welfare losses relative to the …rst-best benchmark. It turns out that this ratio can naturally be determined in terms of observable metrics, notably …rms'market shares. In this way, this literature is potentially useful also for policy purposes as a simple initial screening tool for market performance. 11 
Cournot-Nash oligopoly
Consider a Cournot-Nash oligopoly with n 2 active …rms. Firm i has marginal cost c i and chooses its output q i to maximize its pro…ts i = (p c i )q i , where the price p(Q) with industry output Q P n i=1 q i . Without loss of generality, …rms are ordered such that The …rst-best outcome, which maximizes social welfare W CS + , where P n i=1 i , has price equal to the lowest marginal cost
Denote the corresponding welfare level as W f b .
The …rst-order condition for …rm i is M R i = c i , and the sum of …rst-order conditions
Hence the equilibrium price is given by:
This equilibrium pricing function p (c) is a¢ ne in the unweighted-average unit cost c
, so the pass-through of a cost change that a¤ects all …rms equally dp =dc =
Denote equilibrium welfare and consumer surplus under Cournot competition as W and CS , and de…ne welfare losses relative to …rst-best as:
which is a unit-free measure of welfare that lies on the unit interval, L 2 [0; 1].
Symmetric …rms
To build intuition, it is useful to begin with the benchmark case in which …rms have identical marginal costs, c i = c for all i; Anderson and Renault (2003) showed that:
Equilibrium welfare losses depend only on the number of (symmetric) …rms and the curvature of demand. As expected, they decline with the number of …rms and tend to zero in the limit as the competitors grows large. This re ‡ects the classic result on convergence to perfect competition in large markets.
Welfare losses also tend to zero if the curvature of demand is extreme, either as ! 2 or as ! 1. The case with ! 2 corresponds to very convex demand in which the total revenue to …rms (and hence the total expenditure by consumers) become constant-and thus invariant to the number of …rms competing; since production costs are symmetric, there is no other source of welfare losses. The case with ! 1 corresponds to demand which becomes rectangular (in…nitely concave) so all consumers have identical WTP of for the good; then …rms extract all the gains from trade with a uniform price p = while serving all consumers e¢ ciently. Consistent with the previous monopoly discussion, this is the limit of zero pass-through, ! 0.
More generally, Corchón (2008) shows that welfare losses with symmetric …rms tend to be quite "small". For example, with linear demand ( = 0) the above simpli…es to L(n) = 1=(n+1) 2 . So welfare losses are of order 1=n 2 (as the price and output ine¢ ciencies are both of order 1=n) and in a quantitative sense decline quickly as the number of competitors rises, e.g., L(n) 4% if n 4. For non-linear demands, Corchón (2008) derives the maximal welfare loss for a given number of …rms, that is, b L(n) max L(n; ). As long as there are at least four …rms in the market, overall welfare losses are never greater than around 5.8%. In fact, the textbook case with linear demand generally yields fairly high welfare losses.
Asymmetric …rms
The symmetric case shows that welfare losses due to market power do not tend to be "large"-say well above 5%-in Cournot-Nash models, except in some duopoly cases.
However the symmetry assumption switches o¤ any role for welfare losses due to productive ine¢ ciency. Indeed, it is well-known that Cournot equilibria are not cost-e¢ cient since the lowest-cost …rm does produce all output; high-cost …rms serve too much of the market ( More realistic results revert back to the case where …rms' marginal costs may be asymmetric. The challenge that costs are typically di¢ cult to observe (or even reliably estimate), while there is an advantage in having a welfare measure that depends on observables as far as possible. The trick to resolve this is to use the …rst-order conditions to "substitute out" costs for market shares which are readily available for many markets.
In particular, let …rm i's equilibrium market share s i (q i =Q ), and recall the …rst-
Some rearranging shows that its equilibrium market share satis…es:
which provides a direct mapping between (observable) market share and marginal cost, for a given p as determined above. Note that …rm 1's market share s 1 is the highest since it has the lowest marginal cost, and s 1 s 2 ::: s n .
Based on this, Corchón (2008) shows that welfare losses with asymmetric …rms are given by:
, where
is the Her…ndahl index of concentration, evaluated at the 1 2 More generally, marginal costs are not equalized acrosss …rms (as would occure in a cost-minimizing allocation of any given industry production level). equilibrium market shares. 13 The expression for welfare losses remains simple: they now depend on s 1 and the Her…ndahl index H , both of which previously boiled down to the number of …rms in the symmetric case. 14 Intuitively, market performance under Cournot is described by the Her…ndahl index while the largest market share captures how close this performance is to …rst-best-for which it should equal 100%.
Welfare losses increase with the market share of the largest …rm s 1 (holding …xed the value of the Her…ndahl index). Intuitively, the largest …rm must have an above-average market share; further increasing its size relative to the market pushes the equilibrium closer to monopoly.
Welfare losses decline in the Her…ndahl index (holding …xed s 1 ). While perhaps initially counterintuitive, the reason for the results is that a higher industry concentration shifts market share toward the more e¢ cient …rms (which have lower costs). This mitigates the productive ine¢ ciency of the Cournot equilibrium. The more general point is that the Her…ndahl index is not a reliable guide to market performance. Corchón (2008) shows that welfare losses in asymmetric Cournot models can be very large. Speci…cally, it is possible to …nd combinations of demand conditions ( ) and market structure (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s n ) which yields welfare losses which are arbitrarily close to unity, Surprisingly, it is possible for market performance under Cournot to be worse than 1 3 This expression simpli…es to the symmetric case where H = s 1 = n 1 for all i. 1 4 Again, the demand parameters ( ; ) do not play any role: the in ‡uence of is subsumed in …rms' market shares and is merely a scale factor which does not a¤ect relative welfare losses. (All else equal, doubling halves both W and W f b so their ratio is unchanged.) for a monopoly. Corchón (2008) shows that with log-convex demand ( > 1), monopoly indeed generates the highest welfare loss. However, with log-concavity ( < 1), the socially worst outcome involves a "high" market share (at least 50%) for one …rm combined with a "tail"of very small …rms. The intuition is that the small …rms add little to competition but substantially reduce productive e¢ ciency.
Finally, with asymmetric …rms, market performance is no longer obviously related to cost pass-through. Pass-through (n; ) re ‡ects the number of competitors and demand conditions while welfare losses L(s 1 ; H ; ) also depend on the details of the distribution of …rms'market shares. Market performance can vary widely even for a …xed underlying rate of pass-through.
Endogenous competitive conduct in two-stage games
A signi…cant body of empirical evidence shows that many industrial markets have a competitive intensity that is tougher than Cournot-Nash but falls short of perfect competition (Bresnahan 1989) . One way to model this, as in Section 2, is by adding an exogenous conduct parameter. Similarly, a widely-used class of two-stage strategic games comes with an conduct parameter that is endogenously determined by the interaction of the two stages.
It turns out that welfare losses in such models can be much lower than in the standard Cournot setup.
Consider the two-stage game introduced by Vickers (1985) and Fershtman & Judd (1987) . Each …rm delegates decision-making in the product market to a manager. Manager i receives an incentive contract which induces maximization of an objective function i = This setup re ‡ects extensive evidence that managers across a wide range of industries appear to place signi…cant emphasis on measures of their …rm's size (Ritz 2008 (Ritz , 2014a ).
This is particularly evident in competition for rankings in "league tables"which are based on …rms' sales or market share, not pro…ts-and play a prominent role, for example, in commercial and investment banking as well as in car and aircraft manufacturing. 15 Firms can use their Stage-1 choice of the incentive contract as a commitment device to gain strategic advantage in the product market. 16 Higher values of ' i constitute aggressive output-increasing behaviour since they correspond to placing less weight on costs.
Aggressive behaviour is optimal when …rms are competing in strategic substitutes since it induces a soft response from rivals. From the …rms'viewpoint, this leads to a prisoners' dilemma: each …rm individually has an incentive to engage in aggressive behaviour but this ends up making them collectively worse o¤.
Remark. The exposition here focuses on a widely-used two-stage model of delegation. The game is solved backward for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Manager i's …rst-order condition in Stage 2 is given by:
This implicitly de…nes manager i's best response in the product market. Let q i (' 1 ; ' 2 ; :::; ' n ) denote the Nash-equilibrium output choice, as a function of all …rms'incentive contracts.
Given this, in Stage 1, each …rm's shareholders choose their manager's incentive weight according to:
< 0 is the aggregate response of rivals' Q i P j6 =i q j and dq i =d' i > 0. Combining the two …rst-conditions, the contract places places positive weight on sales revenue ' i > 0 if and only if i < 0. This corresponds to a conduct parameter for …rm i's product-market behaviour; the only di¤erence is that i is here determined endogenously in Stage 1. 17 Ritz (2014a) shows that, with linear demand, i = (n 1)=n < 0 for all i, and equilibrium welfare losses are given by: e L(n; s 1 ; H ) = 1 n(n + 2H ) (n + s 1 ) 2 .
The market share of the largest …rm and the Her…ndahl index play similar roles as in Cournot-Nash ( i 0); the di¤erence is that the number of …rms now also plays a crucial role-because it determines the endogenous competitive intensity as per i .
With symmetric …rms, welfare losses then become e L(n) = 1=(n 2 + 1) 2 . Losses are now of order 1=n 4 , and thus vanish extremely quickly as the number of …rms rises. In e¤ect,
n …rms now behave like n 2 Cournot competitors; even in a duopoly, losses are only 4%.
The reason is that the conduct becomes endogenously more competitive with more …rms; in addition to having "Cournot with more …rms", "Cournot becomes more like Bertrand".
Intuitively, there is more scope to manipulate rivals'behaviour if they are more numerous.
With asymmetric …rms, the key point is that, given more intense competition, lowercost …rms capture larger market shares than under Cournot-Nash. 18 Turned on its head, this means that a weaker …rm can sustain a given market share only if its cost disadvantage is less pronounced than under Cournot-Nash. This additional e¢ ciency e¤ect strongly limits welfare losses.
Ritz (2014a) shows that welfare losses now remain "small" (less than 5%) for many empirically relevant market structures. A simple su¢ cient condition is that the market share of the largest …rm is no larger than 35%. Welfare losses are always small if …rms are 1 7 Instead using a di¤erentiated-products Bertand model in which prices are strategic complements would lead to …rms choosing to place negative weight on sales revenue (' i < 0), which seems at odds with empirical observation. In related work, Miller and Pazgal (2001) show that the equilibrium outcomes (and hence welfare) under di¤erentiated Cournot and Bertrand can be identical if delegation contracts instead take the form of relative pro…ts, e.g., i = i i j (for a …xed n = 2). While competition is as such tougher under Bertrand, this is exactly o¤set by the "soft" equilibrium contract featuring i < 0-while i > 0 under Cournot (strategic substitutes). 1 8 Boone (2008) pursues this logic to develop a novel measure of competition based on how the relative pro…ts of an e¢ cient and a less e¢ cient …rm diverge more stronger when competition is more intense. Also related, Aghion and Schankerman (2004) study the welfare impacts of policies designed to enhance competition, and the political economy of their support, in a di¤erentiated-products model with asymmetric costs. not too symmetric or are su¢ ciently numerous (both in contrast to Cournot-Nash). In the numerical example with s 1 = 40%, s 2 = 30%, s 3 = 20%, and s 4 = 20%, welfare losses are just below 5% (instead of 18% under Cournot-Nash). These insights also extend fairly widely to non-linear demand systems. 19 
Discussion
The above welfare quanti…cations hold equally if …rms'products are vertically di¤erenti-ated in the eyes of consumers, due to (known) di¤erences in quality. In particular, if …rm i faced a demand curve p i = i + p(Q) where i is a measure of vertical product di¤er-entiation, then the …rst-best has the …rm with the highest "value-added", max i f i c i g, produce all output. At equilibrium, higher-quality …rms tend to have too small market shares from a social viewpoint. However, like cost di¤erentials, di¤erences in product quality are fully captured in …rms' observed market shares, allowing for welfare to be estimated.
Welfare losses, in practice, will be lower if the …rst-best outcome is not the relevant benchmark for comparison. For example, the most e¢ cient …rm may not be apply to supply q f b because of capacity constraints or the government intervention that would be required to achieve …rst-best itself causes other welfare-reducing distortions. Welfare losses relative to any second-best optimum will be smaller.
These models can also speak to merger analysis. For example, as long as the postmerger market structure is su¢ ciently symmetric under Cournot-Nash or the largest …rm has market share of less than 35% with delegation, then welfare "losses"remain small even after one or several mergers. 20 In this sense, the welfare impact of the mergers is limited, and there may be little rationale for policy intervention. Note that this is a di¤erent perspective from the usual approach in merger analysis: instead of testing whether or not a merger reduces in welfare, it focuses on whether the level of welfare losses remains "small" post merger (regardless of the direction of change). 1 9 In related work on restructured electricity markets, Bushnell, Mansur & Saravia (2008) emphasize how retail-market commitments by vertically integrated players play a similar role to forward sales in Allaz & Vila (1993) -and how such long-term commitments can substantially improve market performance.
2 0 Strictly speaking, this assumes that the underlying …rst-best welfare remains una¤ected by the merger; this will be the case either if the most e¢ cient …rm is not involved in the merger, or if it does not experience any e¢ ciency gains.
Conversely, welfare losses would be higher if either the mode of competition in the industry is (tacitly) collusive or if the approximate welfare standard is skewed more strongly toward consumers, e.g., W = + CS with < 1. Cournot-style equilibria with very concave demand (low cost pass-through) often produce high W but only low CS-and hence possibly also low W . 21 For example, Cournot-Nash equilibrium with linear demand yields CS =W f b = 1=(1 + s 1 ) 2 , so consumer losses due to market power will be substantial-and sometimes very large-unless the largest …rm is itself small relative to market. 22 Other strands of the literature develop related models with endogenous conduct which may have similar welfare properties that lie between Cournot-Nash and perfect competi- costs, and argues that informational losses can outweigh those due to classical market power. Its e¤ect on deadweight losses is of order 1=n while that of market power is of order 1=n 2 . Put di¤erently, a larger number of …rms is more e¤ective at curbing market power than reducing informational distortions. It would be interesting to know more about 2 1 This may explain why policymakers often appear to have a distaste for low pass-through markets; while these often yield low deadweight losses, consumers typically capture only a small fraction of the gains from trade. 2 2 This formula can be obtained heuristically by setting = 0 and H = 0 in the expression for L(s 1 ; H ; ); superimposing a zero Her…ndahl in e¤ect takes away industry pro…ts. 2 3 Holmberg and Newbery (2010) study how deadweight losses vary with market structure, demand elasticity and capacity utilization in a application of the supply-function approach to electricity markets. how such e¤ects play out with (ex ante) …rm heterogeneity. 24 
Social costs of endogenous entry
Recent work provides several re…nements to the classic result that, in symmetric oligopoly, there is a tendency towards "excess entry": more …rms enter than would be chosen by a social planner (Mankiw & Whinston 1986 ). 25 In the long run, …rms decide endogenously on whether to enter a market (at some cost, which is sunk). Amir, De Castro and Koutsougeras (2014) show for Cournot models that excess entry arises if and only if there is "business stealing": each entrant, to some degree, captures sales from incumbents rather than serving new customers; per-…rm output
Hence there is wedge between private and social incentives: some of an entrant's pro…ts are a transfer from incumbent …rms but yield no social gain; since entry is costly, this wedge matters for welfare. In free-entry equilibrium, each individual …rm is too small from a social perspective. 26 
Quantifying welfare losses due to excess entry
Most of the existing literature examines a second-best setting in which the social planner cannot in ‡uence post-entry pricing, and focuses on qualitative results. In more recent work, Corchón (2008) quanti…es the welfare losses L arising in a symmetric Cournot freeentry equilibrium, relative to the …rst-best social optimum-in which a single …rm enters and price equals marginal cost. Welfare losses under free entry are sometimes very large, 2 4 In recent work, Gabaix, Laibson, Li, Li, Resnick & de Vries (2016) highlight how price-cost margins (rather than welfare) under (symmetric) monopolistic competition can be much less sensitive to the number of …rms than under Cournot. They show that, in a random utility model in which goods are homogenous but consumers are a¤ected by random Gaussian "taste" shocks, markups are asymptotically proportional to 1= p ln(n). One interpretation is behavioural: "consumer confusion" not captured in standard models of imperfect competition may result in signi…cantly higher prices-even in "large" markets. 2 5 Taken literally, the policy implication is that entry should be regulated or otherwise restricted. By contrast, under perfect competition the degree of entry by …rms is welfare-optimal; more entry is then always a good thing for society. 2 6 The same conclusions applies with a moderate degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation, so each entrant adds only little extra variety of value to consumers. However the result can be reversed, leading to "insu¢ cient entry", if competition in the market is very tough (e.g., undi¤erentiated Bertrand), even though at most by one …rm "too few" (Mankiw & Whinston 1986 ). In recent work, Bertoletti & Etro (2016) unify many existing results from endogenous-entry models (with symmetric preferences and symmetric …rms), covering Bertrand, Cournot, and monopolistic competition. even with symmetric …rms, because of the further cost misallocation.
Similar to the previous section, the approach is based on observables as far as possible.
Assuming a free-entry equilibrium, the number of …rms n is observed from market data. 27 The …xed cost of entry K are obtained as follows. (This can also be thought of as a …xed investment cost or R&D outlay required for market entry.) Let (n) denote per-…rm Cournot pro…ts (where 0 (n) < 0). Since the n th …rm decided to enter, K (n) K max , while the (n + 1) th …rm staying out implies that K > (n + 1) K min . (This assumes a su¢ ciently large pool of potential entrants.) So the entry cost is bounded according to
It is clear from Mankiw & Whinston (1986) that welfare losses are increasing in the size of the entry cost; indeed the social ine¢ ciency disappears as the entry cost becomes small.
where is the familiar measure of (constant) demand curvature.
The limiting cases are instructive. First, with a large number of observed entrants in the industry, welfare losses tend to zero. In such cases, operating pro…ts are driven down to almost zero, so the entry cost must have been tiny to have allowed so many …rms to participate. Hence the outcome is essentially equivalent to perfect competition.
Second, with a very convex demand curve ( ! 2) industry pro…ts are only a very small fraction of the overall surplus generated. Hence the entry cost sustaining n …rms in the market cannot be very large, and so welfare losses are again tiny.
Third, and conversely, with a very concave demand curve ( ! 1), industry operating pro…ts are very large relative to consumer surplus. So if some potential entrants nonetheless chose not too enter, then the …xed cost must be substantial-and so there is a lot of socially wasteful cost outlay. Indeed, if the …xed cost is large enough to wipe out all industry pro…ts, then welfare losses tend to 100%. Speci…cally, Corchón (2008) shows that L min = (n 1)=n 1 2 while L max = 1. This latter set of cases is interesting because it contrasts so strongly with a …xed number of …rms. With exogenous n, welfare losses under symmetric Cournot tend to zero as ! 1; the incentive for …rms to withhold output disappears as they capture all surplus at the margin. By contrast, with endogenous n, the majority of this surplus is dissipated by …xed costs.
To get a feel for how welfare losses remain "large" in interior cases, consider the case with linear demand. Using the results in Corchón (2008) , it is easy to check that L min (4) 21:8% while L max (4) is just over 30%. This is at least 5-7 times as high as the loss of 4% with an exogenous four …rms. For a larger number of …rms, the gap
shrinks as per-…rm pro…ts decline. With ten …rms, welfare losses are bounded by 13.5-16.0%; they remain above 5% until the number of …rms exceeds 35.
Firm heterogeneity and endogenous entry
More recent work on endogenous entry has relaxed the assumption that potential entrants are symmetric, allowing for di¤erences in …rms'marginal costs and in the timing of market entry. By contrast, classic models of "excess entry" leave no room for competition to enhance productive e¢ ciency via selection-and thus deprive it of one of its fundamental roles.
Vickers (1995) develops a simple Cournot example with unit-elastic demand (i.e., p(Q) = S=Q with …xed industry revenue S) to illustrate how the adverse e¤ects of entry may thus be overstated. Suppose that each …rm discovers its unit cost (low or high) following entry; the industry already consists of three …rms; the question is on the welfare impact of a fourth entrant.
If the entrant ends up being high-cost and at least two incumbents are low-cost, then it …nds it optimal to not produce, so the externality from entry is zero. Even if only one incumbent is low-cost, the negative externality is less pronounced than under symmetry since business stealing mainly a¤ects the high-cost incumbent.
The entry externality turns positive if two of the three incumbents are high-cost; entry by a low-cost …rm then induces one of the less e¢ cient incumbents to quit, and the e¢ cient incumbent again expands output post-entry. 28 Surprisingly the literature does not appear to have generalized this example to richer market structures or to di¤erent forms of competition. Etro (2008) shows how a …rst-mover facing endogenous entry of followers typically behaves "more aggressively" than under simultaneous moves, and how this is good for social welfare. This stands in contrast with Stackelberg leadership against a …xed number of …rms, which is well-known to be critically sensitive to the question of strategic substitutes (which leads to aggressive behaviour and a …rst-mover advantage) versus strategic complements (which yields a second-mover advantage).
Intuitively, endogenous entry means that the leaders'attention shifts from away from the reactions of followers at the margin (are strategies substitutes or complements?) to how its behaviour a¤ects entry, that is, their participation constraints. Since products are substitutes, more aggressive behaviour (more output or lower prices) always leads to a favourable response: rivals'non-entry (or exit) becomes more likely.
To illustrate, consider quantity competition one leader and m potential followers. Demand is linear p(Q) = 1 Q and costs are zero-apart from the entry cost K. 29 The key point is that, with free entry of followers determined by a zero-pro…t condition, the number of actual entrants decreases with the leader's output. Etro (2006) shows that the equilibrium thus features strategic entry deterrence; the market leader produces q L = 1 2 p K, which prevents any entry, and the limit price is p = 2 p K.
This simple example already has some interesting welfare implications. The price is higher than in the free-entry Cournot equilibrium (simultaneous moves), so consumers are worse o¤-contrary to the …xed-n Stackelberg logic. However, social surplus is nonetheless higher because of the pro…ts made by the leader-which are associated with the saving on entry costs. The observed market structures are radically di¤erent: the market has ‡ipped from n active …rms with identical shares to a single quasi-monopolist.
Etro (2008) studies a general "aggregative game"in which each …rm's pro…ts depend on its own action and a summary statistic of those of its rivals combined, that is, …rm i's payo¤ i = (x i ; X i ) K where x i is its own action (e.g., price or output) and
captures the "externalities" arising via the actions of other players, where h( ); h 0 ( ) > 0.
This setup nests as special cases quantity competition with di¤erentiated products as well as price competition with logit and iso-elastic demand, amongst others. Typically the leader produces more than under simultaneous moves or prices lower than the followers; this achieves a Pareto improvement in the allocation of resources.
The general implication is that large market shares of leading …rms in an industry can be good news for social welfare; this also restores the notion of a …rst-mover advantage that prevails under both price and quantity competition. The details of a Stackelberg free-entry equilibrium depend on …rms'strategic variables (price or quantity), the nature of product di¤erentiation, and the shape of their cost functions. 30 Mukherjee (2012) builds on these insights to show that the "excess entry" result can be reversed in markets with leadership and endogenous entry. The model has a single leader which enjoys a unit cost advantage relative to a tail of symmetric followers, and a linear homogeneous-products demand curve. The analysis is again second-best in that the social planner chooses the number of followers taken as given that they will engage in Stackelberg competition with the leader post-entry.
The main novelty is a "business creation" e¤ect: the leader's optimal response to an increase in the number of followers is to raise production, dq L =dn > 0. The reason is that its output rises with the followers' cost, and does so more stronger if there are more of them. Intuitively, the leader meets more rivals with a "…ghting response"which leverages its cost advantage. (More formally, the leader's optimal output is supermodular in its cost advantage and the number of follower-entrants.)
The key insight is that the excess-entry result is reversed if the leader's cost advantage is su¢ ciently pronounced. Then the new business-creation e¤ect dominates the standard business-stealing e¤ect (which still exists amongst the followers), and more followers than delivered by the market would be socially desirable.
Discussion
The welfare metric used in the literature on endogenous entry is social surplus, so that the productive ine¢ ciency arising from excess entry counts. Instead using consumer welfare, ) analyze the welfare impacts of changes that a¤ect only a subset of …rms a market-such as a merger or a technology change-in a general aggregative-game setup. They show that the short-run impacts (e.g., a merger raises prices) of the change are often fully neutralized in the long-run with endogenous entry (i.e., the merger has no impact on prices). The key condition is that the marginal entrants, who make zero pro…ts, are not directly a¤ected, e.g., by the merger-and their actions e¤ectively pin down the behaviour of the aggregate (and hence prices) over the long run.
an extra entrant is always socially desirable as long as it reduces prices; the market, if anything, delivers insu¢ cient entry. 31 The additional welfare losses that arise with endogenous entry thus have a similar e¤ect to placing less weight on consumer surplus in the social-welfare function. Lowering in W = + CS pays less attention to pro…ts either for normative reasons or because these pro…ts are dissipated in another way. Incorporating wasteful rent-seeking costs which …rms incur in securing market power (Posner 1975 ) has similar e¤ects.
A central conclusion is that surplus losses remain large with endogenous entry even with a considerable number of …rms in the market. Again, this conclusion can be substantially altered in two-stage models of competition. When post-entry competition is more intense, the inferred entry cost for any given number of observed entrants is well below that of from sequential models are fairly robust. However, with high entry costs, the details on the timing of the entry process become important and "insu¢ cient entry" more likely:
from a societal perspective, a …rm may be too fearful of an "entry mistake" (more …rms enter than the market can support).
Finally, Kremer & Snyder (2015) emphasize a related source of welfare losses which arises from under-entry. Suppose that there is only a single potential entrant and that, from a social standpoint, it would be e¢ cient for this …rm to invest. However, if this …rm is unable to appropriate a su¢ ciently large fraction of the surplus as pro…ts, it will choose not to enter; as a result, the market does not come into existence. 32 Kremer & Snyder (2015) provide worst-case bounds which take into account the possibility of such "zero entry", and argue that the resulting welfare losses can be large-for instance, in the pharmaceuticals industry in which consumers'valuations for products often vary widely.
Conclusion
The recent literature o¤ers some new perspectives on a signi…cant body of existing knowledge on oligopolistic competition and social welfare.
In a fairly broad class of oligopoly models, the division of surplus between …rms and consumers is importantly determined by the rate of cost pass-through. Empirical estimates of pass-through across di¤erent markets thus o¤er indirect inference on welfare metrics.
Yet pass-through is not a panacea in settings with …rm heterogeneity, and the link between theory and the econometrics of pass-through still needs further tightening in future research.
The degree of welfare loss in widely-used Cournot-style models is often surprisingly modest, even relative to …rst-best and with signi…cant industry concentration. Under
Cournot-Nash competition, losses can be signi…cantly higher due to cost asymmetries between …rms yet their adverse impact is strongly limited in two-stage models with tougher competitive conduct. Losses are also typically much higher under a consumer-welfare standard. Future research could examine more closely the interaction between heterogeneity in …rm's costs and asymmetric information.
Market performance is similarly reduced in dynamic models featuring "excess entry"
which dissipates a signi…cant fraction of …rm pro…ts. Recent work has extended these results to allow for Stackelberg leadership as well as di¤erences in …rms'costs. Both can be good news for social welfare, especially if the market leader also enjoys a cost advantage.
Future research may focus on how these results map onto the empirical study of speci…c markets.
